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THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM AND ITS EFFECT ON
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 2010, the FBI and United Kingdom law
enforcement orchestrated what is now known as the “Catch 22” sting
operation. 1 Undercover FBI agents, posing as members of the
Nigerian Defense Ministry, used a confidential informant to conduct a
false transaction with an individual suspected of bribing the Nigerian
Ministry in a $15 million arms sale. 2 The sting operation yielded solid
evidence against the suspects, and the FBI subsequently arrested
twenty-two corporate executives and employees in the military and
law enforcement-product industry. 3
The Catch 22 sting operation may be the most creative example of
the recent surge in Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) charges against companies and
individuals violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 4
(“FCPA”) and securities laws. 5 At the end of 2010, thirty-four
individuals and companies were awaiting trial on FCPA charges.6
1 CATCH-22: Lessons from DOJ's Massive Undercover FCPA Sting, MCGUIRE WOODS
LLP (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/item.asp?item=4481; see
also
FBI
Charges
22
Over
Alleged
Foreign
Bribery,
BBC
NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8469117.stm (last updated Jan. 19, 2010, 8:25 PM)
(describing an FBI sting operation that resulted in the arrest of 22 individuals suspected of
bribing the minister of defense of an African country in violation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act).
2 FBI
Charges
22
Over
Alleged
Foreign
Bribery,
BBC
NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8469117.stm (last updated Jan. 19, 2010, 8:25 PM).
3 Id.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3 (2006). The FCPA generally makes it unlawful for a
company or people acting on its behalf to “offer . . . promise to give, or authoriz[e] . . . the
giving of anything of value to” foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. 15 U.S.C. §
78dd–1(a) (2006).
5 Since 2008, the number of prosecutions and fines for violations of the FCPA alone have
increased dramatically. For example, Siemens AG paid $800 million to the SEC and
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In July 2009, the SEC charged two corporate executives for
violations of Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B) and 30A
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20,
13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder. 7 The SEC did not allege that the
executives had personal knowledge of, or involvement in, the illegal
conduct, yet the executives consented to have final judgments entered
against them. 8 Each executive paid $25,000.9 Thus, the SEC is
aggressively pursuing individuals responsible for corporate
corruption, whether or not those individuals had actual knowledge or
direct involvement in the violation. On March 18, 2010, the SEC
Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami stated that “law enforcement
authorities within the U.S. and across the globe are working together
to aggressively monitor violators of anti-corruption laws.” 10 The

Department of Justice in 2008 for systematically bribing foreign officials of various countries to
obtain various business opportunities, representing the highest penalty to date. Press Release,
SEC, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available
at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm. On February 11, 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root
LLC (“KBR”) admitted to paying Nigerian officials at least $182 million in bribes in exchange
for its multinational energy joint venture, T.K.S.J. Nigeria LTD (“TKSJ”) and acquiring
contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities. Together, KBR and its parent company,
Halliburton, paid a total of $579 million in fines and disgorged profits. Press Release, SEC, SEC
Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm. KBR’s former CEO, Albert Jackson Stanley,
pled guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA, paid $10.8 million in restitution, and “face[d]
seven years in prison.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former CEO of Kellogg, Brown &
Root,
Inc.
with
Foreign
Bribery
(Sep.
3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-189.htm. Many other corporations were involved in
TSKJ joint ventures to pay bribes to Nigerian government officials, including BAE Systems
PLC, which paid $400 million in fines for establishing offshore shell companies to receive
illegal payments, Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, BAE Systems PLC
Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html; Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V.
and its Italian parent company ENI S.p.A., which paid $365 million in fines and disgorged
profits in July 2010, Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Italian Company & Dutch Subsidiary in
Scheme Bribing Nigerian Officials With Carloads of Cash (July 7, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-119.htm; Technip S.A., which agreed to pay $338
million in fines and disgorged profits in June 2010, Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Technip
with FCPA Violations (June 28, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010110.htm; and JGC Corporation, which paid $218.8 million in April, 2010, Press Release, Dep’t
of Justice, JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation & Agrees to
Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html.
6 FCPA
and
Related
Enforcement
Actions,
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2010.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (listing
chronological docket information for enforcement actions).
7 Nature's Sunshine Products, Inc. Litigation Release No. 21162 (July 30, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21162.htm.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Innospec for Illegal Bribes to Iraqi and Indonesian
Officials (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-40.htm
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Department of Justice recently made FCPA enforcement one of its
highest priorities, leading to a significant increase in prosecutions. 11
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, speaking at the 24th
National Conference on the FCPA on November 16, 2010, openly
warned of this crackdown on corruption: “I am aware that, for some
of you, as we have become more aggressive, you have become more
worried. . . . I want to tell you this afternoon that you are right to be
more concerned.” 12
In general, corporations caught engaging in criminal conduct have
used internal compliance programs that should have prevented their
criminal activities.13 The sting operation, discribed above, and the
hundreds of other prosecutions reveal that under the current system,
internal compliance programs alone cannot be trusted to effectively
discover and eliminate fraudulent corporate conduct. Rather, internal
compliance programs seem to require external incentives to ensure
their effectivness.
On May 25, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“SEC”) adopted final rules to implement the requirements of Section
922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”), 14 which created a whistleblower reward
program. 15 These rules reward individuals who provide the SEC with
high-quality tips that lead to successful enforcement actions against
companies that violate the federal securities laws.16 Whistleblowers
are eligible for a reward of ten to thirty percent of any monetary
sanctions resulting from the SEC enforcement action or any related

(internal quotations omitted).
11 See Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Acting
Deputy Attorney General Gary G. Grindler Speaks at a World Bank International Meeting.
(Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2010/dag-speech101208.html (“[T]he United States has made combating bribery through the rule of law a top
priority.”).
12 Lanny A. Bruer, Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney
General Lanny A. Bruer Speaks at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices
Act,
Dep’t
of
Justice
(Nov.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html.
13 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires corporations to file an internal control report
with their annual and interim reports detailing the establishment and maintenance of internal
control programs, financial reports and an assessment of their effectiveness. Pub. L. No. 107–
204, 116 Stat. 745 § 404 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
14 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
124 Stat. 1841 (2010).
15 SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm.
16 Id. (“The new SEC whistleblower program, implemented under Section 922 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, is primarily intended to reward individuals who act early to expose violations
and who provide significant evidence that helps the SEC bring successful cases.”).
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action. 17 The bounty program coupled with the unprecedented
undercover sting operation 18 exemplify the SEC’s and DOJ’s
aggressive stance on prosecuting and collecting fines from violators
of securities laws. Additionally, the successful extradition of foreign
nationals to the United States to face FCPA charges 19 suggest that the
whistleblower program will play a key role in further identifying and
prosecuting violators of the FCPA and securities law.
But many critics argue that it will do so at a price: the
whistleblower program may incentivize whistleblowers to report out
rather than in, thwarting internal compliance programs that have spent
years building and maintaining. 20 Encouraging employees to report
violations directly to the SEC rather than internally diminishes the
“culture of compliance and integrity” that is essential to the
maintenance of effective internal compliance programs. 21 This
argument begs the question: are companies’ current internal
compliance programs really worth fighting for?
This Comment argues that the current trend in aggressive FCPA
and securities law prosecutions coupled with the new whistleblower
program will likely interfere with already established internal
compliance programs in the short term, but will encourage more
robust and effective internal compliance programs in the long run.
The 2007–10 surge in FCPA charges is a clear example that the SEC
and DOJ are right not to leave it up to companies’ compliance
programs to find and report violations of U.S. laws. Rather, company
employees are in the best position to uncover and prevent these
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §
922, 124 Stat. 1741, 1842 (2010).
18 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
19 See Howard W. Goldstein & Lisa Bebchick, U.K. Extraditions Facilitate Corruptions
Prosecutions, N.Y. LAW J., May 6, 2010.
20 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300 (June 13,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 240 & 249) (“The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, enacted on July 21, 2010 (‘Dodd-Frank’), established a whistleblower
program that requires the Commission to pay an award, under regulations prescribed by the
Commission and subject to certain limitations, to eligible whistleblowers who voluntarily
provide the Commission with original information about a violation of the Federal securities
laws that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action, or a
related action. Dodd-Frank also prohibits retaliation by employers against individuals who
provide the Commission with information about possible securities violations.”).
21 Recent Legislation: Corporate Law – Securities Regulations – Congress Expands
Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1829, 1834 (2011) (citing Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman and CEO of Eaton Corp.,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-142.pdf) (quotation marks omitted); see also
Ben Protess, Former SEC Chief Says Dodd- Frank Misses Goals, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July
12 2011, 7:26 PM) (“‘This provision threatens to undermine corporate governance, internal
compliance and the confidence of public investors in our heavily regulated capital markets.’”)
(quoting Harvey Pitt, former SEC Chief).
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violations. And as companies face the possibility of harsh penalties
and more frequent whistleblowing, they may be encouraged to create
stronger mechanisms for compliance.
This Comment first examines the whistleblower provisions that
preceded the SEC’s final rules. It then describes the provisions of the
SEC regulations on whistleblower bounty and the incentives that the
rules provide for employees to report out rather than in. Next, this
Comment addresses the potential negative and positive consequences
of these incentives to internal compliance programs. It concludes by
arguing that an aggressive stance on FCPA and securities violations
will help businesses formulate legal and profitable ways to do
business and will bolster current internal compliance programs that
have been ineffective to date.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES
The United States has enacted a variety of statutes designed to
encourage employees to blow the whistle on fraudulent conduct. 22
Many of the whistleblower statutes are enacted in response to
financial scandals. For instance, Congress enacted the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act in reaction to insider trading
scandals like the Drexel Burnman Lambert, Inc. scandal. Likewise,
after the Enron and Worldcom debacles, Congress enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 23 The effectiveness of these statutes however
has varied tremendously. This section discusses the most notable of
these statutes and compares them to the SEC’s Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provisions. 24
“[T]he first statutory cause of action protecting whistleblowers
from employer retaliation” was the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978. 25 The Civil Service Reform Act only protected federal
employees, however, 26 and, overall, it “had little impact.” 27 Congress
22 See, e.g., Lucienne M. Hartman, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The FairytaleLike Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of “Greedy,” the
Eighth Dwarf, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2011) (citing Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,
Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 111 (2007)) (detailing protections for whistleblowers that
existed prior to the Dodd-Frank Act).
23 Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6
OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 123, 125 n.17 (2011) (citation omitted).
24 See Hartman, supra note 22, at 1280–86 (discussing the three notable whistleblower
statutes prior to the Dodd-Frank Act and comparing them to the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower protections).
25 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 125; see also S. REP. No. 100–413, at 2 (1988) (the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 “prohibited . . . personnel action against an employee in reprisal for
a disclosure of government wrongdoing or fraud, i.e., ‘whistleblowing’”).
26 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 125.
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later expanded the whistleblower protections by enacting the
Whistleblower Protections Act of 1989. 28 This Act modified prior
whistleblower protections by establishing a separate agency to litigate
claims, 29 permitting whistleblowers to file claims without government
support under certain circumstances 30 and allowing courts to shift
attorneys’ fees from whistleblower plaintiffs to defendants.31
Alternatively, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 32 provided
a financial reward to whistleblowers. Under the 1934 Act, the SEC
rewards a whistleblower with up to ten percent of a monetary sanction
collected from a company for violating insider-trading laws. 33
However, the whistleblower’s reward is not guaranteed: the SEC
reserves absolute discretion in determining whether to grant an award
and, if so, its amount. 34 Because whistleblowers are unable to rely on
this statute, and because the award is unsubstantial, the statute is an
ineffective incentive for potential whistleblowers.35 Thus far, only
five people have received awards in the twenty years the statute has
been in effect, totaling a mere $159,537. 36
The False Claims Act, 37 however, has been more effective than the
1934 Exchange Act. Congress enacted the False Claims Act in 1863,
and has amended it several times38 to produce the government’s
“primary vehicle . . . for recouping losses suffered through fraud.”39
The Act provides two ways a whistleblower can receive an award for
reporting fraud: (1) the Attorney General can bring a civil action

27 Id. The percentage of federal employees reporting known fraud did not change
following the act’s passage, while an increased number of employees failed to report illegal
activity. Id. at 125 n.20 (citing S. REP. NO. 100–413, at 2 (1988)).
28 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989).
29 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–12, § 1221, 103 Stat. 16, 29
(1989).
30 Id.
31 Id. § 1221(g)(1).
32 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006 & Supp. 2009).
33 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1(e) (2006).
34 Id.
35 See Robert R. Stauffer & Andrew D. Kennedy, Dodd-Frank Act Promises Large
Bounties
for
Whistleblowers,
LAW.COM
(Aug.
23,
2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/article.jsp?id=1202470880915.
36 See Hartman, supra note 22, at 1282–83 (discussing the merits of the whistleblower
provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
37 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
38 The False Claims Act was amended in 1943, 1986, and 2009. Hartman, supra note 22,
at 1282 (citing Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78–213, 57 Stat. 608 (1943); False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986); Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009)).
39 Hartman, supra note 22, at 1282 (quoting Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam
Fortune: Do Military Service Members Have Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False
Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45, 47 (2004)) (quotation marks omitted).
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against a violator, in which case the whistleblower would receive 15
to 25 percent of any penalty the government collects from the
investigation, 40 or (2) any individual “may pursue the claim, qui tam,
if the government chooses not to pursue the claim within sixty days of
filing the claim.” 41 Either way, the False Claims Act guarantees both
the whistleblower’s award 42 and retaliation protection. 43 The False
Claims Act has been successful—“[i]n the 2010 fiscal year,” for
example, “the Department of Justice recovered $3 billion in False
Claims Act cases, with whistleblower awards totaling $385
million.” 44
More recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 45 provides antiretaliation
protection for whistleblowers who report securities-related
violations. 46 The provisions prohibit employers from taking
retaliatory action against a whistleblower and entitle victims of
retaliation to reinstatement, back pay, and legal fees. 47 SarbanesOxley requires that corporations create internal compliance programs
that “‘provide employees with a standardized channel to report
organizational misconduct internally within the corporation.’” 48
The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010, amended significant
portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For instance, it (1) broadened the
scope of protected disclosures, 49 (2) removed the requirement that
claimants first exhaust all administrative remedies with the
Department of Labor before bringing an action in federal district
court, 50 and (3) provided more expansive remedies such as granting a
31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)–(d)(1) (2006).
Hartman, supra note 22, at 1283 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006)).
42 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
43 Id. § 3730(h).
44 See Hartman, supra note 22, at 1284 (citing False Claims Act Update & Alert: DoJ
Recovers $3 Billion in FY 2010 False Claims Act Cases, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD
EDUCATION FUND (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.taf.org/whistle299.htm.).
45 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in Titles 15 and 18 of the United States Code).
46 Id. § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006) (amended 2010)).
47 Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)–(c) (2006) (amended 2010)).
48 Hartman, supra note 22, at 1285 (quoting Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond
Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 115 (2007)).
49 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (providing protection for employees who
disclose information about violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348; “any rule or
regulation of the SEC; or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders”),
with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §922,
124 Stat. 1376, 1846 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)) (protecting all
disclosures protected by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, additionally, any disclosures under the Security
Exchange Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), “and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to
the jurisdiction of the [SEC]”).
50 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)) (requiring
that a complaint be filed with the Secretary of Labor before permitting de novo review by a
40
41
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whistleblower who succeeds in a retaliation claim two times the
amount of back pay including interest in addition to reasonable
attorneys fees and costs of litigation. 51
In addition, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been
supportive of the notion that whistleblower employees are key to
enforcement and must be protected from retaliation. Jurisprudence on
whistleblower statutes runs on the “Antiretaliation Principle,”52 which
recognizes “that employees must be protected from retaliation in
order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and criminal
laws.” 53 The Supreme Court generally assumes that “employees are in
the best position to know about illegal conduct by their employer[,] . .
. employees will report this information if the law protects them from
employer retaliation[,] . . . [and] employee reports about misconduct
will improve law enforcement.” 54 The Court’s fifty-year
jurisprudence sends a “clear message: employees play an important
role in enforcing statutory laws and the Court will provide employees
broad protection from retaliation in order to enhance enforcement of
those laws.” 55
Based on the array of statutes available to whistleblowers and the
Supreme Court’s supportive interpretations, some commentators
assert that the legal system sufficiently supports whistleblowers.56
However, as others contend, higher complexity in American financial
institutions, technology, and communications only increases the need
for whistleblowers’ reports. 57 This Comment asserts that precisely

district court), with Dodd-Frank Act §§ 748, 922 (permitting an antiretaliation civil action to be
brought directly in federal district court).
51 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2))
(authorizing relief for an individual prevailing in an antiretaliation action to include
reinstatement with the same seniority status, back pay with interest, and compensation for
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees), with Dodd-Frank Act § 922
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u–6(h)(1)(C)) (providing for double back pay with interest in
addition to reinstatement and compensation for litigation costs and fees).
52 The “‘Antiretaliation Principle’ allows the [Supreme] Court to examine antiretaliation
protection as a law-enforcement tool that benefits society, rather than simply as extra protection
for employees provided at a cost to employers.” Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s
Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 380 (2010).
53 Id.
54 Id at 380–81. The Court even interpreted explicit antiretaliation provisions in statutes
that contained no specific provision granting such rights. Id. at 383 (discussing the Court’s
treatment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (1958), as interpreted
in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960)).
55 Id. at 392.
56 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 126 (“[W]histleblowers enjoyed a broad array of federal
protection to incentivize securities fraud reporting prior to Dodd-Frank.”).
57 Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L.
REV. 905, 917 (2002) (discussing the increased need for “private justice” in modern society and
the necessity of fostering private justice by encouraging whistleblower reporting).
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because of these complexities public regulation, now more than ever,
needs inside sources that can provide information typically “hidden
from public view.” 58
II. THE SEC FINAL RULES
On July 21, 2010, in response to the financial crisis that began in
2008, 59 President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 60 which governs a wide variety
of financial institutions ranging from credit card companies61 to
mortgage lenders. 62 One provision in particular is under scrutiny for
its potential effect on internal compliance programs. 63 Section 922 of
the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 64 by adding section 21F, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives
and Protection.” 65 This section expanded the incentives for employees
to blow the whistle by (1) requiring the SEC to provide substantial
bounties to whistleblowers who provide useful information to the
SEC regarding securities law violations,66 and (2) providing enhanced
retaliation protections where the whistleblower can receive stronger
protection if he or she reports directly to the SEC but weaker

Id. at 916.
Times
Topics:
Financial
Regulatory
Reform,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulato
ry_reform/index.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2011).
60 Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the
United States Code). The Dodd-Frank Act addresses a number of key issues including (1)
consolidating regulatory agencies and establishing committees to oversee specific high risk
institutions; (2) highly regulating financial markets, especially highly risky transactions; (3)
instituting consumer protection reforms; and (4) addressing the necessary institutional
mechanisms such as “FDIC authority to allow for the orderly winding down of bankrupt firms,
and a proposal that the Federal Reserve receive from the U.S. Treasury Department extensions
of credit in exigent circumstances.” Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Robust
Whistleblowing
Incentives,
FORBES
(Apr.
14,
2011,
9:20
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/04/14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robustwhistleblowing-incentives/.
61 See Dodd-Frank Act § 920 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o–2) (imposing various
limitations on “payment card networks,” including credit card networks).
62 See id. §§ 1400–98 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C.)
(designating Title XIV of Dodd-Frank as the “Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act” and imposing regulations on the mortgage industry).
63 See, e.g., supra note 21, 1831–32 (2011) (noting that, as a potential drafting error,
Dodd-Frank affords antiretaliatory protection only to employees who report externally); Nathan
Koppel, Dodd-Frank Detractors May Be Headed to a Courthouse Near You, WALL ST. J. LAW
BLOG (July 29, 2011, 10:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/07/29/dodd-frank-detractorsmay-be-headed-to-a-courthouse-near-you/ (commenting on the “litigation storm clouds”
surrounding Dodd-Frank, including the whistleblower provision).
64 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78pp (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
65 Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6).
66 Id.
58
59
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protections if he or she reports to the company via the internal
compliance programs. 67
The SEC’s final rules were adopted to implement the Dodd-Frank
Act requirements. The rules define a “whistleblower” as an
individual, not a company or entity, who provides the SEC with
information that relates to a “possible violation” of federal securities
laws, the FCPA, or commodities laws that has occurred, is ongoing,
or is about to occur. 68 The whistleblower may remain anonymous
when reporting possible violations, but, to do so, must report through
an attorney. 69 If whistleblowers provide information before a request,
inquiry, or demand is directed to the whistleblower personally by the
SEC or other government authorities, the whistleblower’s report is
considered “voluntary.” 70 However, a submission will not be
considered voluntary if the whistleblower has a preexisting legal duty
to report such information to the SEC arising from a contract with the
SEC or another law enforcement agency, or arising under any judicial
or administrative order. 71
A whistleblower is eligible for an award only if the incriminating
information is (1) based upon the whistleblower’s independent
knowledge or analysis not already known to the SEC, (2) not
exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or
administrative hearing, government report, or the news media, unless
the whistleblower is the source of that information, and (3) first
provided to the SEC on or after July 21, 2010.72 The whistleblower
will only receive an award if the information is “sufficiently specific,
credible and timely to cause” the commencement or reopening of an
investigation resulting in successful enforcement action.73 If the
reported violation was already under investigation, the SEC will
consider whether the new information “significantly contributed” to
the success of the action. 74 While certain exclusions apply, 75 the
whistleblower will receive an award that is “at least 10 [percent] and
no more than 30 [percent] of the total monetary sanctions” collected
in successful actions. 76
Id.
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,363 (June
13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R 240.21F–2(a)).
69 Id. at 34,367 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–7).
70 Id. at 34,364 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(a)).
71 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(a)(3)).
72 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(1)).
73 Id. at 34,365 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(c)(1)).
74 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(c)(2)).
75 Id. at 34,364–65 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4)(i)–(vi)).
76 Id. at 34,366 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–5).
67
68
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The final rules incorporated by reference the provisions of the
Exchange Act that protect individuals who report information to the
SEC with a reasonable belief 77 that such information relates to a
possible securities violation, regardless of whether the individual
satisfies the requirements to receive an award. 78 A whistleblower has
antiretaliation protection if he reports information in a manner
described in section 21F(h)(1)(A). Thus, the rules provide incentives
for whistleblowers to report violations either internally or externally.
III. INCENTIVES TO REPORT INTERNALLY
The final rules incentivize, but do not require, a whistleblower to
report first through his or her company’s internal compliance
program. The rules provide three primary incentives. First,
whistleblowers can obtain the same award when they report through
their companies’ internal compliance programs and the company
informs the SEC of the violation.79 If the company does not have an
internal compliance program, reporting to legal counsel, senior
management, or a director still renders the whistleblower eligible for
the reward. 80 Second, the final rules provide that a whistleblower’s
voluntary participation in a company’s internal compliance program
is a factor that can increase the amount of an award while interference
with such a program is a factor that has the reverse effect.81 Third, the
rules create a 120-day “look-back” period, under which an individual
can qualify for an award if he or she first reported the possible
violations to the company under the company’s internal compliance
77 To satisfy the reasonable belief requirement, the individual must “hold a subjectively
genuine belief that the information demonstrates a possible violation, and that the belief is one
that a similarly situated employee might reasonably possess.” Id. at 34,303. This approach is
consistent with the approach followed by various courts that have construed the antiretaliation
provisions of other federal statutes, including the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Parker v. Balt. &
Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that, in a Title VII retaliation case,
“[t]he employer is sufficiently protected against malicious accusations and frivolous claims by a
requirement that an employee seeking the protection of the opposition clause demonstrate a
good faith, reasonable belief that the challenged practice violates Title VII”); Hindsman v. Delta
Airlines, Admin. Rev. Bd. Case No. 09–023 at 5 (Dep’t of Labor June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/ARB/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/AIR/09_023.AIRP.PDF
(interpreting the antiretaliation provisions of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act, which explicitly excludes frivolous complaints and those brought in bad faith, as
requiring a “reasonable belief” by the whistleblower that the violation of the statute has
occurred).
78 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,363 (June
13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R 240.21F–2(b)(1)).
79 Id. at 34,365 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R 240.21F–4(c)(3)).
80 Id. at 34,325 n.224 (suggesting that, because of the need for proof that the
whistleblower provided original information, employees in this situation “generate, obtain and
retain” appropriate documentation).
81 Id. at 34,366–67 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–6).
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program, and then submitted the same information to the SEC within
120 days. 82
The rules’ effect on internal compliance programs was a
significant issue commentators discussed in the rules’ Proposing
Release. 83 Comments were sharply divided between supporting a
requirement for internal reporting and opposing such a requirement.
Supporters note that internal reporting would allow companies to take
appropriate actions to remedy improper conduct earlier, 84 allow
companies to self-report, 85 avoid undermining internal compliance
programs that companies have designed to deter, identify and correct
violations, 86 preserve the SEC’s scant resources 87 and promote
working relationships between the SEC and the companies, 88 among
others. Requiring internal reporting to the opposing side meant
“prohibit[ing] whistleblowers from reporting fraud directly and
immediately to the [SEC],” 89 “creat[ing] unnecessary and improper
hurdles for whistleblowers,” 90 “result[ing] in whistleblowers deciding
not to report misconduct” 91 (perhaps because of a “risk of
Id. at 34,365 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(7)).
Id. at 34,300.
84 Id. at 34,325 (citing Letter from Chamber of Commerce et al., to Elizabeth Murphy,
Sec’y, SEC, (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310110.pdf).
85 Id. at 34,324 (citing letter from Gary M. Brown, Baker, Donaldson, Bearman,
Caldewell & Berkowitz PC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-140.pdf).
86 Id. (citing Letter from Gary M. Brown, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &
Berkowitz, PC, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-140.pdf; E-mail from Americans for Ltd. Gov’t
et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 7, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-110.pdf; Letter from Michelle Davies, Acting
Gen. Counsel, Foster Wheeler AG, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 13, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-111.pdf; E-mail from Apache Corp. et al., to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s733-10/s73310-150.pdf; Letter from Donna Dabney, Vice President, Sec’y, & Corp. Gen.
Counsel, Alcoa Inc. et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-182.pdf; E-mail from Allstate Ins. Co. et al., to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s733-10/s73310-189.pdf.
87 Id. (citing E-mail from Americans for Ltd. Gov’t, supra note 86).
88 Id.
89 Id. (citing Letter from Stephen M. Kohn, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr., to Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (May17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310-314.pdf).
90 Id. (citing Letter from Cleveland Lawrence, III, Acting Exeucitve Director, Taxpayers
Against Fraud, to Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-228.pdf).
91 Id. (citing E-mail from Julie Grohovsky, Wu, Grohovsky & Whipple et al, to Elizabeth
Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-3310/s73310-136.pdf; E-mail from Danielle Brian, Exec. Dir., Project on Gov’t Oversight, to
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s733-10/s73310-163.pdf).
82
83
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retaliation” 92), and “eliminat[ing] incentives for companies to
improve their internal compliance programs.” 93 The SEC decided it
would not require mandatory internal reporting, noting that, while
important, internal compliance programs are “not substitutes for
rigorous law enforcement.” 94
The SEC commented that the objective of these provisions,
namely the “look-back” provision, was to support, not undermine, the
effective functioning of company compliance and related systems by
allowing employees to take their concerns to the company officials,
and simultaneously preserving their rights under the Commission’s
whistleblower program. 95 Internal compliance programs are “essential
sources of information for companies about misconduct.” 96 However,
these provisions seek to “strike a balance” between relying on internal
programs and receiving the best information possible in reports.97
Although some companies may have “well-documented, thorough,
and robust” compliance programs, others do not. 98 Leaving it up to
the whistleblower to assess whether to report potential securities
violations internal or externally is therefore well supported.
IV. INCENTIVES TO REPORT EXTERNALLY
Despite its three incentives for using internal compliance
procedures, the Dodd-Frank Act has been criticized as setting
employees against their companies by primarily encouraging external
reporting. Critics focused on a “two-tiered” structure of protections
that benefits whistleblowers who report externally versus internally. 99
The SEC’s whistleblower rules provide greater antiretaliation
protections than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was “the first
comprehensive statute of national scope” that provided protections to
corporate whistleblowers. 100 For reported information and employees
not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley, 101 employees can receive Dodd92 Id. (citing Letter from Cleveland Lawrence III, supra note 90; Letter from Julie
Grohovsky, supra note 91; Letter from Danielle Brian, supra note 91).
93 Id. (citing Letter from Danielle Brian, supra note 91).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 34, 323.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 34, 317 n.154.
98 Id. at 34, 323.
99 See Recent Legislation, supra note 21, at 1834.
100 Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
101 Sarbanes-Oxley provides protection for information the whistleblower believes
constitutes a violation of any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission or
any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 § 806(a)(1) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
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Frank protections by reporting externally, but they receive no
protection if they report internally. 102 If the reported information or
the employee is covered by Sarbanes-Oxley, the employee will
receive Dodd-Frank protections by reporting externally, but will
receive only the weaker Sarbanes-Oxley protection by reporting
internally. 103
Other commentators are concerned that Dodd-Frank protects
whistleblowers without requiring the whistleblower to hold a
“reasonable belief” that a breach of securities law occurred.104 The
SEC addressed some of these concerns in the final rules by
implementing the “reasonable belief” requirement while at the same
time retaining the two-tiered system that distinguishes between
internal and external reporters. The rules also addressed concerns that
employees are encouraged to report out, rather than in, by providing
whistleblowers the same bounty for reporting internally under certain
circumstances.105 However, it is doubtful whether the law’s retaliation
policy actually influences a whistleblower’s decision to report.
V. THE FINAL RULES’ EFFECT ON INTERNAL COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS
The final rules are indeed likely to increase whistleblower reports,
but they are also likely to prompt companies “to run to the SEC
before one of its employees gets there first.” 106 Former SEC
enforcement attorney Paul Huey-Burns thinks the “thumb is on the
scale on the side of self-reporting” 107 and companies will, now more
than ever, hire lawyers and forensic accountants to strengthen their
compliance systems to prevent future violations. Critics worry that
the rules pit the companies’ Chief Compliance Officers against the
employees, rather than encourage them to work together.108 The
common complaint is that internal compliance programs that have

and 18 U.S.C.).
102 See Recent Legislation, supra note 21, at 1834.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1833 (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376,
1841–42, 1845 (2010) (describing what constitutes “original information” and discussing the
prohibition on retaliations against employees who provide “original information.”).
105 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing potential awards for
whistleblowers who report matters internally).
106 Daniel Fisher, SEC Whistleblower Rule Means More Work for Lawyers, FORBES (May
26, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2011/05/26/sec-whistleblower-rulemeans-more-work-for-lawyers/.
107 Id. (quotations omitted).
108 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 137 (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act undermines the
effective internal compliance programs which more adequately address securities violations).
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taken years to build will be pushed to the wayside as whistleblowers
greedily seek their bounty. Critics claim that, because companies
investigate 75 percent of internal reports and that 40 percent of
internal investigations led to company action in 2009, the internal
compliance programs are sufficient to capture corporate legal
violations. 109
The real concern of companies may be quite different than the one
expressed. Companies may not be as worried about the new rules
foiling their internal compliance programs as they are concerned
about the cost of complying with securities laws. The ingredients for
a sound internal compliance program are no longer limited to simply
providing a forum where whistleblowers may report violations.
Rather, companies now have to cultivate a trustworthy and reliable
program that promises not to retaliate or ignore whistleblowers’
complaints. Companies are worried that investing in attorneys and
forensics accountants will rack up expenses on their already tight
budgets. 110 But these resisting companies may be ignoring the
importance of effective internal compliance programs and what it can
do for their bottom line.
The final rules seem to already be achieving their goal of
promoting stronger internal compliance programs. Companies are
beginning to support the internal compliance programs by providing
employees with incentives to use the programs, including provisions
in employee contracts that require internal complaints, and may even
offer their own bounties to compete with the SEC. 111 Even the critics
acknowledge that the Dodd-Frank Act provisions “may require
management training to avoid whistleblower retaliation, and all
businesses may need new policies to encourage internal reporting.” 112
While Sarbanes-Oxley requires all public companies to have
whistleblower mechanisms in place, the old mechanisms have not
proved effective. 113 In fact, an empirical study of the False Claims
Act, which requires no mandatory internal reporting, stated that “the
overwhelming majority of employees voluntarily utilized internal
reporting processes, despite the fact that they were potentially eligible
for a large reward under the [Act].” 114 One study found that the SEC
109 Id.

(citation omitted).
at 139 n.138.
111 Emily Chasan, CFO Report: Companies Adjust to Looming Whistleblower Rule, WALL
ST. JOURNAL (July 29, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2011/07/29/companies-adjustto-looming-whistleblower-rule/?KEYWORDS=whistleblower+sec+final+rules.
112 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 139.
113 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
114 Impact of Qui Tam Laws on Internal Compliance: A Report to the SEC, NAT’L
110 Id.
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is more likely to sanction companies who are proactive about selfreporting, but also more likely to issue a lower penalty.115
The risks associated with ineffective and uneforcemeable fraud
and corruption regulations are far worse to society than the expenses a
company may incur to bolster their internal compliance systems.
What if the Enron debacle was avoided by insiders revealing their
concerns to public regulators? The company may not have gone from
the seventh largest American company to the largest bankruptcy in
American history; its stocks may not have plunged from $86 per share
to $0.27 per share; and it may not have ended up with $13.12 billion
in debt. 116 The few whistleblowers that did report Enron’s
wrongdoing did so only internally, through mechanisms many argue
are effective and should be preserved.117
Moreover, the recent surge in FCPA prosecutions, described
above, uncovers yet another failing of internal compliance
programs. 118 Such corruption “‘erode[s] society from the inside.’” 119
Illegal economic activity in America costs hundreds of billions of
dollars and negatively impacts lower and middle class Americans
disproportionately. 120 Corruption and fraud have important social
costs too: weakened respect for the law and unstable political and
financial institutions. 121
The United States government recognizes what companies choose
to ignore: employees are essential sources of information. A 2008

WHISTLEBLOWERS
CTR.,
AT
4
(2010),
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/DoddFrank/nwcreporttosecfi
nal.pdf. The study found that 89.7 percent of employees who eventually filed False Claims Act
cases had made an internal report, despite the absence of a legal requirement to do so. Id. The
False Claims Act, however, does contain higher barriers to participation than does the
Whistleblower program, such as the requirement of filing a federal court complaint alleging
fraud with specificity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while the
Whistleblower program only requires whistleblowers to fill out a Form TCR sworn under
penalty of perjury. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300,
34,327 n.232 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249).
115 Rebecca Files, SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really
Matter? (Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640064.
116 See Bucy, supra note 57, at 942 (citations omitted).
117 Id. at 943 (citations omitted).
118 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the different requirements for
filing claims under the False Claims Act and the Whistleblower program).
119 See Bucy, supra note 57, at 929 (quoting EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION XIII (1983) (citation and quotation omitted)).
120 See STEPHEN M. ROSOFF ET AL., PROFIT WITHOUT HONOR: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
AND THE LOOTING OF AMERICA 28 (2010) (discussing how personal frauds and antitrust
violations could cost Americans approximately $250 billion dollars a year.).
121 See Bucy, supra note 57, at 934–40 (detailing the social harms that can occur as a result
of economic corruption and crimes).
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study by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners examined 959
cases of fraud in United States companies found that forty-six percent
of instances of fraud were uncovered by whistleblowers, more than
those found by audits or internal controls.122 Employees only reported
outside when their complaints were ignored, or when they were
punished for speaking up. A 2010 National Whistleblowers Center
study found that approximately ninety percent of employees who filed
False Claims Act lawsuits initially reported violations internally to
their supervisors or compliance officers.123 Rather than using the
valuable information to promote compliance through an effective
internal compliance program, companies are instead punishing their
loyal employees 124 and causing them to report elsewhere, where their
valuable information will be appreciated. If the companies continue to
undervalue whistleblower information, whistleblowers will indeed
turn outside of the company to make their reports.
Fortunately, the SEC explicitly leaves it up to the whistleblower to
decide the most appropriate forum for reporting. 125 Complex
economic wrongdoing, such as securities and FCPA violations,
require those who are intimately familiar with it for proper detection
and deterrence. 126 Congress and the Supreme Court consistently
provide whistleblowers with rewards and protections because, as
government officials have stated, “whistleblowers are essential to our
operation. Without them, we wouldn’t have cases.”127
CONCLUSION
The spike in FCPA and securities law prosecutions combined with
the new whistleblower program has instilled fear in the corporate
world that the result of the trend for enforcement will only be costly
122 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, ASSOC. OF CERTIFIED
FRAUD EXAM’RS, at 18 (2008), http://www.acfe.com/documents/2008-rttn.pdf.
123 NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., IMPACT OF QUI TAM LAWS ON INTERNAL
COMPLIANCE:
A
REPORT
TO
THE
SEC
4
(2010)
available
at
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/DoddFrank/nwcreporttosecfi
nal.pdf.
124 See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud, 65 J. FIN.
2213, 2216 (2010) (discussing how a 2007 study by the nonpartisan National Bureau of
Economic Research found that in eighty-two percent of cases where whistleblower’ identities
were revealed, the employees were fired, quit under duress, or lost significant job
responsibilities.).
125 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323 (June
13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249) (“Ultimately, we believe that
whistleblowers are in the best position to assess whether reporting potential securities violations
through their companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems would be effective.”).
126 Bucy, supra note 57, at 940 (noting that “[c]omplex economic activity usually is buried
in paper trails and electronic messages and hidden within an organization.”).
127 Id. at 941 (citations and quotations omitted).
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for the companies and for the market as a whole. However, the
numerous studies and the even greater number of recently prosecuted
violations indicate that the problem is not the whistleblower; it is the
companies’ own failed internal compliance programs. Each
corporation that the SEC and DOJ prosecuted had its own internal
compliance programs and each of those programs failed to prevent
and uncover violations. Those cases evidence the shortcomings of the
internal compliance programs and stress the need for incentives to
encourage companies to make appropriate changes. While the DOJ
and SEC will continue to aggressively prosecute violations, the
whistleblower program encourages companies to provide an internal
resource that will render the SEC’s whistleblower program futile.
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